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Introduction 
 
The referendum on Scottish independence in September 2014 has given fresh impetus to 
debates on the place of national values and national identities within the politics of social policy 
in Scotland and the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. ‘National values’ have 
been appropriated and deployed by all parties within the independence debate and this highlights 
deeply rooted tensions and contradictions about the provenance and place of the core values of 
welfare that inform social policy and public service institutions in Scotland.  
We argue that the adversarial debate evident in Scotland since 1999 between secessionist and 
unionist nationalisms covers over the complex realities of identity within Scotland and the UK. 
Simplistic constructions of national identity, both Scottish and British have been deployed by 
political elites to evoke feelings of commonality or distinctiveness to accord with the political 
values of fairness and thrift.  The framing of social policy issues in this way deflects attention 
from real issues of social need which transcend national boundaries. The distraction applies to 
debates about the politics of welfare within parties (particularly Labour and the SNP) as well as 
between parties. 
Debates on devolution and Scottish independence have produced a fixation on the politics of 
identity. This has produced a political paradox in which parties of the centre left present issues of 
social rights and responsibilities as ‘national’ concerns and concepts of fairness and social justice 
as national values. There is a danger that the universal conceptions social citizenship which have 
endured since the 1940s will be threatened by different national settlements in the constituent 
nations of the UK. We conclude by arguing for a renewed focus on active citizenship and 
participatory democracy.  
Global trend towards devolution 
 
It is often argued that the process of globalisation is promoting higher levels of international 
homogeneity. National sovereignty is increasingly subject to the influence of supranational 
associations (the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, International Monetary 
Fund and United Nations). At the same time, however, place has achieved greater prominence in 
a «global trend towards devolution », involving «widespread transfer of powers towards regions» 
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(Rodriguez-Pose, A. and Gill, N., 2003: p.333). Different forms of decentralisation of 
responsibility and resources are evident in the regional governments of Australia, Canada, India 
and the USA; and the European federal governments of Austria, Germany and Belgium. Greater 
devolution of powers to regions has taken place in Spain, Portugal and France; and beyond 
Europe in Mexico and Brazil. As Michael Keating (2004: p.241) observes, «states in Europe and 
elsewhere are being transformed, losing power upwards to global and European institutions, 
downwards to regions and localities and outwards to the market and civil society». 
 
Political devolution in the UK has opened up new spaces for local inflection of trans-national 
policy agenda. Formal devolution of legislative powers from Westminster (on different terms 
and with varying powers) followed referenda in Scotland and Wales in 1997 and Ireland in 1998. 
The UK has been described as «an asymmetrical composite state full of different but inchoate 
allegiances» (Colley, L. 1999: p.3). Scotland has, of course, been able to exercise considerable 
policy discretion without self-determination, retaining autonomous civil institutions of law, 
religion and education. In post-devolution and pre-referendum times, the ‘nation’ is used to 
construct boundaries between devolved and reserved powers, set against the contingences of 
inter-regional spillovers (UK) and supranational externalities (European Union). Policy making 
post-devolution in Scotland involves multi-level governance through complex social and political 
networks. 
 
Devolved Scotland is a leaky container. First, as a power container it encompasses controls over law, home 
affairs, and the police; second, as an economic container it exerts some control over agriculture, fisheries, 
planning, economic development, training, and tourism; third, as a social container it controls health, social 
work, housing, and local government; and, fourth, as a cultural container it controls education, the arts and 
sport, and the natural and built environment. (Law, A. and Mooney, G., 2012a: p.69) 
 
If devolution, as the former leader of the UK Labour Party, John Smith, claimed, reflected «the 
settled will of the Scottish people», the election of the fourth Scottish Parliament in May 2011 
offers an opportunity for reassessment. The Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a majority 
government for the first time (winning 69 of 129 seats), providing a strong mandate for further 
devolution of powers. On the 15th October 2012, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Alex 
Salmond, First Minister of the Scottish Parliament, signed the Edinburgh Agreement for a 
referendum on an independent Scotland, to be held on 18th September 2014. Should the SNP 
achieve its aspiration of a velvet divorce from political union with Westminster it seeks to retain 
five unions - the European Union, NATO, the currency, the Crown and the social union with 
the rest of the UK. 
 
National identities  
 
National identities and nationalisms are invented and malleable constructs (Anderson, B. 1991; 
Billig, M. 1995). Historians have long acknowledged that the collective identity of the British is 
inextricably connected with many different peoples and different histories (Colley, L. 2009). 
National identity is not fixed but discursively produced. Contemporary discussion encompasses 
plural and inclusive constructs of national identity, which is one among many overlapping 
sources of identification that include gender, ethnicity, political allegiance, class, region, age, 
sexuality and faith.  
 
Political discourse in the UK from 1980 has directed attention to the relative weakening of a 
unitary British national identity. Collective identity is important in the constitution of political 
power. Labour politician Gordon Brown (2004, 2006) sought to reclaim symbols of national 
identity from the Conservative Party, arguing that the Union flag might become «a flag for all 
Britain – symbolising tolerance, inclusion and unity» (Brown, G. 2004, n.p.). Brown’s reassertion 
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of Britishness was, in part, a reflection of his personal standing as a Scottish UK premier-in-
waiting (Hassan, G. 2009). Britishness was positioned as uniting all at a time when 
multiculturalism was increasingly regarded as a threat to social cohesion from an assimilationist 
perspective (Cable, V. 2005). Brown (2007) referred to Britain 52 times in his first conference 
speech as leader. In championing «One Nation Labour» the current Labour leader made 60 
references to Britain in his 2013 conference address (Miliband, E. 2013). 
 
If Britishness is a «cultural artefact» (Anderson, B. 1991: p.4) forged through time and struggle 
(Colley,  L. 1999), then similarly there is no single, static version of Scottishness (or nationalism 
in Scotland). Rather there are competing images of Scotland and Scottishness that are mobilised 
by political elites to serve particular ends (Mycock, A. 2012).  Cultural homogeneity cannot be 
assumed in small countries. Within the UK there are «varieties of Irishness» (Foster, R.F. 1989) 
and cultural variants of Scottishness, Welshness and Englishness (independent of political 
institutions). David McCrone (2001: p.28) describes modern Scotland as «a country of city-
states» with distinctive socio-cultural, economic and demographic features between the four 
centres of population – Glasgow and Dundee, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. In policy circles the 
revival of Gaelic and Scots are important symbols of Scottish identity. The use of religion to 
define Scottishness has been most marked historically by divisions between Protestants and 
Catholics (which obscure doctrinal schisms e.g. between Presbyterians and Episcopalians). This 
is most prevalent in the West of Scotland (Gallagher, T. 1987, 2013). At the 2011 census the 
ethnic minority population of Scotland was 4 per cent (192,900) with weak neighbourhood 
concentration outside Glasgow (where ethnic minority groups comprise 12 per cent of the 
population) (National Records of Scotland, 2013).  
 
Elite and mass conceptions of Scottishness cannot be assumed to be congruent (Leith, M.S. 
2012). Political nationalism encompasses left-right positions and is evident in both unionist 
nationalism and secessionist political stances. Daniel Soule, Murray Leith and Martin Steven 
(2012: p.3) maintain that, in the current context «all Scotland’s politicians are nationalist in their 
outlook». Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders in Scotland all deploy national 
values and patriotism in their own versions of unionist nationalism (Ichijo, A. 2012: p.26). Much 
attention has focused on emphasising civic rather than ethnic nationalism (McCrone, D. 2001). 
Dennis Smith (2013, np) is keen to assert that «Scottish ethnicity, if it exists, has little to do with 
Scottish nationhood». The current leadership have sought to displace negative characterisations 
of the «cancer of the south» as promulgated by former party leaders (Gardham, M. 2013, np). 
Attempts have been made to promote a more inclusive approach to identity that recognises and 
values diversity. This re-envisioning of Scottishness enables the reconciliation and valorisation of 
divergent traditions. The SNP Member of Parliament (MP) and Member of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSP) George Reid (1995) has described the Scottish national identity as «a tradition 
built on the common weal of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the Calvinists, the social 
concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement and the civic nationalism of 
today» (cited by Henderson, A. and McEwen, N. 2005: p.183). Speaking in July 2013, Alex 
Salmond commented, «[W]e have an attractive identity and it’s all the more so because we don’t 
insist on it being a single identity. People are free to be dozens of different things and we should 
be confident that Scottishness will be part of that» (McKenna, K. 2013, np). A newly crafted 
cosmopolitan Scottishness is presented as both inclusive and yet avowedly distinct. 
 
Social Attitudes 
 
Drawing on the 2012 Scottish Social Attitudes survey, John Curtice (2013: p.5) maintains 
«Scottish identity is a near ubiquitous attachment that unites rather than divides most people in 
Scotland. It is how British they feel that divides them». The Moreno question is typically used to 
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establish the balance of state and sub-state identity i.e. people are asked if they feel «Scottish, not 
British», «More Scottish than British», «Equally Scottish and British», «More British than 
Scottish» or «British, not Scottish». Dual identities remain common. In 1999 22 per cent of 
respondents to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey saw themselves as equally Scottish and 
British.  In the 2011 census 18 per cent of the population of Scotland defined themselves as 
Scottish and British. Part of «being Scottish» is not being English, and this has been associated 
with the «Englishing of the Conservative Party» from 1997 (McCrone, D. 2001: p.185). In 2013 
there remains just one Conservative MP in Scotland. As «being English» became associated with 
the values of laissez-faire Conservatism (1979-97) followed by the social liberalism and moral 
authoritarianism of New Labour (1997-2010), «being Scottish» was increasingly positioned as 
upholding the values of a distinctively Scottish communitarianism. How well does this enduring 
political rhetoric, which amplifies difference, correspond with contemporary social attitudes? 
 
Trends in public views post-devolution are enabled through comparison of responses to the 
British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys between 1999-2010 i.e. British Social Attitudes 
respondents living in England. Based on such analyses John Curtice and Rachel Ormston (2012: 
p.21) maintain that, «people in Scotland are generally a little more likely than those in England to 
express social democratic views. However, this difference has not widened since the advent of 
devolution. Rather, opinion in both countries has moved in a somewhat less social democratic 
direction». In 1999, 71 per cent of respondents in Scotland and 61 per cent of respondents in 
England felt that wealth inequalities were too large; falling to 59 per cent in Scotland and 55 per 
cent in England by 2010. In 1999 84 per cent of respondents in Scotland and 80 per cent of 
respondents in England felt that income inequalities were too large; falling to 78 per cent in 
Scotland and 74 per cent in England by 2010. In 2010 20 per cent of respondents in Scotland 
and 18 per cent in England felt that no students or their families should have to pay 
undergraduate tuition fees (Curtice, J. and Ormston, R. 2011: p.4). Curtice and Ormston (2012: 
p.28) claim «the gap has grown wider only because the move away from a social democratic 
stance has been less marked in Scotland than in England».  
 
Analysis of secondary datasets suggests that «what matters to the public is much the same in 
Scotland as it is in England» (Ormston, R. and Curtice, J. 2007: p.69). This is reiterated in public 
opinion research that suggests continuing widespread support for the welfare state in the UK 
(Diamond, P. and Lodge, G. 2013). Citizens of the devolved territories in the UK have broadly 
similar aspirations and express support for a European social model (Keating, M. 2009). David 
McCrone (2006: p.8) argues, «if we divide public opinion in Scotland and England into left, 
centre and right in ideological terms, in Scotland the centre more resembles the left than it does 
the right, whereas in England the centre is closer to the right». What we appear to have then is a 
degree of policy divergence supported by a devolution settlement that may not be matched by 
attitudinal divergence across the publics that comprise the UK. Devolution produces variation 
from a UK baseline, usually upwards, that has been mobilised to provoke inter-regional tensions 
in relation to welfare and public spending (Jeffery, C. 2007). 
 
As often as not, there is little specifically “national” behind the values and principles promoted within 
nation-building discourses. Clearly similar values may be identified across national boundaries … in the 
context of overlapping national boundaries, and at time, conflicting national identities, the presence of 
minor value differences or the priority attached to particular values can assume a heightened political 
significance … The belief that values are distinctly national may be more important than any objective 
evidence to the contrary (Henderson, A. and McEwen, N. 2005: p.177). 
 
Based on the above review, we suggest that attempts to codify a set of key «values» and 
«qualities», or to focus primarily on places and people, rather than systems, «policies or 
institutions» (Gamble, A. and Wright, T. 2009: p.4), may distract those who seek to understand 
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the complexities of contemporary devolved societies. The process of devolution has given rise to 
more sophisticated electoral systems and voting behaviour among the electorate of Scotland. A 
broad commitment to welfare and public services may produce Labour votes in UK parliament 
elections (in opposition to an English Conservative majority) and an SNP vote for Holyrood 
(which uses the additional member system). In the following section we examine how «Scottish 
values» are deployed in debates in Holyrood on the future of welfare and public services - a key 
site of contestation in 2013. 
 
National values and welfare reform  
 
Reference to a set of distinctive social values permeates political discourse in Scotland. In 
opposition John Swinney, then SNP Leader, maintained a vocal campaign to «restore» Scottish 
values to Scottish public policy vis-a-vis «London Labour».  
 
My job is to restore Scotland’s values to Scotland’s Government. Those Scottish values are deep-seated 
and cherished. They are values of fairness, honesty and equal opportunity. This party has those traditional 
Scottish values running through its very core. (Swinney, J. 2002 np) 
 
The re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament draws on a long «tradition of communitarian 
debate with liberalism» that is often taken to be a defining feature of Scottish social philosophy 
(Paterson, L. 2002: p.122). The austerity measures that followed the economic crisis revived 
debate on the amalgam of social and individual responsibility in centre-left politics. Twenty-first 
century political discourse recalls nineteenth century traditions of Scottish Presbyterianism and 
late twentieth century debates on the role of the state. Speaking at the 2009 SNP conference, 
Deputy Leader Nicola Sturgeon proclaimed, «[W]e must reassert our traditional values of 
probity, thrift and a commitment to hard work. It is to these values - these Scottish values - that 
we must return and on which we must now build our economic recovery» (np). Margaret 
Thatcher mobilised stereotypical notions of Scottish prudentialism in her reassertion of Scottish 
liberalism: «Tory values are in tune with everything that is finest in the Scottish character…the 
values of hard work, self-reliance, thrift and enterprise» (cited by Henderson, A. and McEwen, 
N. 2005: p.184).  
 
In January 2013 Sturgeon, now Deputy First Minister, called for an Expert Working Group on 
Welfare to look at benefit payments in Scotland, to consider changes to the current system in an 
independent Scotland, and to make initial recommendations for how a welfare system might 
reflect «Scottish values». This initiative was positioned in direct contrast to The 2020 Vision: 
Agenda for Transformation report published by the Conservative 2020 group that proposed lower 
benefits in parts of the country where the cost of living was deemed less expensive (2020 Group, 
2013:32). The Scottish Parliament voted in April 2013 to defend universal services - free 
personal care for older people, no up-front tuition fees for resident Scottish students, 
concessionary travel, free eye tests, no prescription charges, and retention of the Education 
Maintenance Allowance for post-compulsory education - deemed to represent the social contract 
with Scotland’s people. In March 2013 Alex Salmond drew evocatively, once more, on Scotland’s 
national bard, Robert Burns, to proclaim, «the rocks will melt with the sun before we allow Tory 
or Labour to take away the right to free education in Scotland» (SNP 2013, np). The interim 
report of the Expert Group, published in June 2013, recommended an independent Scotland 
share the UK welfare system for a transitional period. A new expert panel, convened in August 
2013 to continue deliberation, will report in spring 2014. The new members of this group 
include Jon Kvist, University of Southern Denmark, and an advocate of the Nordic welfare 
model.  
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Both the Yes and No campaigns in the lead up to the independence referendum make recourse 
to Scottish values. Launching United with Labour in May 2012 Johann Lamont, elected Holyrood 
Labour Leader in December 2011, argued, «My Scotland stands for equality and solidarity. For 
freedom and justice. Those qualities have no borders. To put borders upon them doesn’t just 
render those values meaningless - it contradicts everything that modern Scotland has ever stood 
for» (Lamont, J. 2012a, np). Launching the Better Together campaign in June 2012, supported by 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, Alastair Darling maintained that the 
referendum was «a chance to re-affirm Scottish values and our expression of them in our 
partnership with our neighbours» (p.3).  
 
There is less scope for centre-right perspectives to be heard in Scotland.  David McCrone (2001: 
p.25) predicted that Scottish politics would be shaped by whichever of the two main parties - 
Labour and the SNP - «best expresses the prevailing social democratic mood of the nation».  The 
trade unionist activist Jimmy Reid joined the SNP in 2005 and the Jimmy Reid Foundation 
(2013) is a vocal advocacy group for the «common weal». The SNP have encroached upon the 
core ideological territory and key concepts of the Scottish Labour Party (and to some extent its 
achievements in office). Attempts by the UK Labour Party to «reconstruct Britishness» via 
Gordon Brown’s  initiatives and to borrow «one nationism» from the Conservative Party 
(Miliband 2012, 2013) revealed a lack of strategy to counter the loss of centre left ground to the 
SNP who have successfully equated cultural nationalism with social democracy. The SNP sought 
to colonise territory vacated as the leadership of the UK Labour Party moved to the right. 
Perhaps the single most striking example of policy divergence between the Labour Party north 
and south of the England-Scotland border was the adoption of personal health care for the 
elderly in Scotland, a major expansion of the principle of social citizenship (Hassan, G. and 
Shaw, E. 2012).  
 
Since the Labour Party’s 2011 Scottish Parliament defeat the party has taken incremental steps to 
reform and adapt policy in preparation for the 2016 Holyrood election. Where Labour in the UK 
Westminster parliament is making progress, Labour in Scotland faces a considerable challenge in 
responding to the rise of Alex Salmond’s SNP - although in the council elections of May 2012, 
(using the Single Transferable Vote system), Scottish Labour held Glasgow and North 
Lanarkshire, and gained Renfrewshire and West Dunbartonshire (Denver, Bochel and Steven, 
2012). In September 2012 Johan Lamont made a controversial «something for nothing» speech 
to launch a fairness debate on the longer-term affordability of universal benefits (Lamont, J. 
2012b). In February 2013 Deputy Leader Anas Sarwar repeated the case for welfare reform 
based on Scottish Labour values of «community, solidarity, fairness, equality and social justice» 
(Watson, D. 2013: p.14). Scottish Labour’s Welfare Commission will report after the 2014 
referendum. An interim report on support for further powers to the Scottish Parliament in 
Holyrood indicates that Labour MSPs are prepared to go further than Labour MPs. A shadow 
cabinet reshuffle in June 2013 has accompanied a loosening of ties with the UK Labour Party. 
All parties, including Scottish Conservatives, now favour more powers for the Scottish 
Parliament. Labour and Liberal Democrat proposals are similar in regard to devolved income tax 
and the retention of welfare benefits and national insurance by Westminster. The opposition 
centre-left unionist parties are thus all moving in a similar direction in proposing greater powers. 
Where there is broad consensus on loosely defined social democratic values, disagreement 
centers on issues of sustainability in the context of contracting resource. Within the congested 
centre ground parties battle to assert a distinctive policy platform within circumstances of fiscal 
restraint that articulates with their own interpretation of the national mood and national values. 
 
Public expenditure and place-based «need» 
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Resource allocation in decentralised government is contentious. The economics of relative need 
is often underscored by cultural readings of «problem» populations and locales. This is evident in 
a language of subsidy that does not address the erosion of the «residual state role of 
redistribution, stabilisation and management of the national economic space» (Pike, A. and 
Tomaney, J. 2009: p.30). Needs must be met within the context of declining resource after a 
period of year-on-year growth: «The real terms increase in Scottish Government spending 
between 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 is estimated to have been around 60 per cent (i.e. 5 per cent a 
year). From 2009-10 to 2016-17, the budget change is estimated to be an 18 per cent real terms 
cut» (CPPR, 2012: 4). The Government Economic Strategy estimates, «it could take until 
2025/26 for the Scottish Government budget to return to 2009/10 levels in real terms - an 
adjustment period of sixteen years» (Scottish Government, 2011: p.28). The challenges of fiscal 
restraint are creating difficult choices and some tension between central (Holyrood) and local 
government (Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities). In 2007 a concordat was agreed 
between the Scottish Government and the 32 local authorities of Scotland. While Holyrood sets 
the direction of policy and expected national outcomes, local authorities are responsible for 
shaping service delivery in response to local needs and circumstances. The Christie Commission 
(2011: p.viii) on the future delivery of public services has argued that, «Unless Scotland embraces 
a radical, new collaborative culture throughout our public services, both budgets and provision 
will buckle under the strain». 
 
Constraints on social policy divergence bring to the fore debates on the balance of devolved and 
reserved powers and the financing of devolution. Public expenditure is higher in Scotland than 
England. During 2011-2012 total expenditure on services per head in real terms in Scotland was 
£10,240 (12,410 Euro) compared to £8,618 (10,445 Euro) in England (HM Treasury, 2013: 
p.117). The allocation of public expenditure to the devolved administrations of the UK through 
the Barnett formula has been subject to increasing attack on the grounds of territorial equity i.e. 
for failing to adequately reflect the relative needs of the different jurisdictions and regions (Select 
Committee on the Barnett Formula, 2009). Comparative analyses of spending needs on school 
education (King, D. et al., 2004; Ball, R. et al., 2012a), healthcare (Ball, R. et al., 2012b) and local 
social services (King, D. et al., 2007) highlight the contestability of assessments of need and the 
complexity of resource allocation across different territories using different formulae.  
 
Employment and social security are matters reserved to the UK Parliament. Recent research 
suggests that benefit spending per person in Scotland is above the average for the UK but the 
gap is closing. In 2011-12 benefit spending per person in Scotland was £3,238 per year (3,924 
Euro), 2% higher than the average for the UK (£3,176, 3,849 Euro); compared with 7 per cent 
higher in 2005-6 (Phillips, D. 2013: p.2). Greatest divergence is evident in expenditure on 
disability benefits, which in 2011-12 - per person in the population - was 22 per cent higher in 
Scotland (£593, 718 Euro) than in the UK as a whole (£485, 587 Euro) (ibid, p.2). The estimated 
impact of benefit reforms between 2010 and 2015 on household incomes is broadly similar. 
Estimates suggest that household incomes in Scotland will contract by 1.6 per cent of net 
income, on average, compared with 1.7 per cent for the UK as a whole (Phillips, D. 2013: p.3). 
This is largely attributed to lower rents in Scotland reducing the impact of changes to housing 
benefit. Employment rates for Scotland and the rest of the UK are also very similar: in 2012, 
72.2 per cent in Scotland and 74.4 per cent of the UK as whole (Phillips, D. 2013: p.3). Despite 
the sharp contraction in public sector employment from 2009 (leaving aside the entry of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB to the public sector when the UK Government 
became the main shareholder), in 2013 public sector employment still accounts for 23 per cent 
of total employment in Scotland (Scottish Government National Statistics, 2013), with significant 
regional variation e.g. 19 per cent in Aberdeenshire, 37 per cent in Dundee City and 47 per cent 
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in Orkney. The range for the UK as whole is 13 per cent – 18 per cent in the South East of 
England and 31 per cent in Northern Ireland (Bell, D. et al., 2012: p.5). 
 
Health and education are devolved matters and key areas of policy divergence. Comparison of 
local authority spending needs as assessed by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 
England and the Scottish Executive/Scottish Government suggest that funding models for 
school education produce similar estimates of relative need but some inequity in resource 
allocation between 2003 and 2011 (King, D. et al., 2004; Ball, R. et al. 2012a).  Although Scotland 
performs well in cross-national comparisons of pupil attainment, enduring social inequalities in 
participation and achievement raise questions about the rate of progress facilitated through 
devolution (Machin, S. et al., 2013; Ridell, S. et al., 2013). Healthcare expenditure comprises 40 
per cent of the expenditure of the devolved administrations. Ball et al. (2012b: p.323) maintain 
that « [R]elative to England, average annual per capita spending on health was 15 per cent higher 
in Scotland (equivalent to £226 per person, 273 Euro), 9 per cent higher in Wales (£130 per 
person, 157 Euro), and 6 per cent higher in Northern Ireland (£88 per person, 106 Euro) over 
the five-year period from 2004/05 to 2008/09». Applying the Scottish formula, Ball et al. (2012: 
p.322) calculate that «England’s per capita health care expenditure need is around 10 per cent 
lower than Scotland’s, while Wales’ per capita expenditure need is around 2 per cent lower than 
Scotland’s, and Northern Ireland’s is around 7 per cent lower than Scotland’s». The higher 
expenditure in Scotland is justified in terms of higher levels of long-term morbidity and mortality 
from 1980 (especially for NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde). Although a relatively wealthy 
country, Scotland has one of the lowest levels of life expectancy in Western Europe (McCartney, 
G. et al., 2011).  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The balance of individual and social responsibility differs among advanced welfare states 
(Esping‐Andersen, G. 1990) and is subject to further deliberation through processes of 
decentralisation. In Scotland the devolution settlement has supported an amalgam of competitive 
and welfare nationalism – a focus on enterprise, individual responsibility and social justice to 
deliver a Scotland that is both «wealthier» and «fairer». Margaret Arnott and Jenny Ozga (2010) 
refer to this hybrid mix as «modernised nationalism». The economic crisis from 2008 has 
impacted on the dual challenge of promoting fairness and competitiveness; a relationship in 
which fairness is always positioned as subordinate to and dependent on the primary goal of 
economic growth. The primacy of economic growth is reasserted in Empowering Scotland: The 
Government’s Programme for Scotland 2013-14 (SG, 2013). The «recovery» of an economic model that 
has not addressed long-term inequality is questioned by critics who point to the association 
between national measures of equality, well-being and competitiveness. Mike Danson and 
Katherine Trebeck (2013: p.3) argue «the structural reason for poverty in Scotland lies in the 
financialised, consumerised economy which transfers money from the broad base of citizens to a 
small number of corporations and individuals». The programme outlined in Empowering Scotland 
suggests continuity with neo-liberal economic policies, and the use of existing devolved powers 
for remedial purposes. 
 
From an «English perspective» (King, D. et al. 2004, 2007) devolution appears to promote 
territorial inequity across the UK. However, it is important to approach such analyses with caution. 
As Gerry Mooney (2009: p.446) argues a selective reading can be used to construct «the idea of 
welfare dependency among Scots, indeed of Scottish welfare dependency, cosseted by «English» 
money»» (as parodied in The Economist «Skintland» cover of 14th April 2012). From a Scottish 
centre-left (nationalist and unionist) perspective social policy differentiation, and enhanced 
powers, are aimed at promoting territorial justice through strategies for poverty reduction (Chaney, 
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P. 2013). An espoused «Scottish» commitment to egalitarianism and social democratic values is 
mobilised in calls for greater powers to address Scottish issues (notably enduring income 
inequalities). There is less political capital in emphasising the shared values and aspirations of the 
citizens that comprise the UK publics when different parties hold office in the different 
jurisdictions.  
 
There is a shared enthusiasm across party political boundaries for work as the key route out of 
poverty. Progressive taxation to produce significant redistributive effects is not likely to prove 
electorally popular. In Scotland this presents the challenge of promoting a low tax-high spend 
economic model alongside demands for fiscal autonomy. The SNP programme for 2013-14 
supports reform of the welfare system and commits to «design a tax system that encourages 
Scotland’s growth», reducing inequalities through «preventative spend» (SG, 2013: p.22). 
Following a Yes vote control over welfare would be used to «develop a system that will 
encourage those who can and should work into work», a simpler system that ‘makes work pay» 
(ibid p.80). Opposition is directed at minimising the impact of austerity measures because they 
have been imposed «too far and too fast» (Scottish Government, 2013: p.80). Successor schemes 
include the £33m Scottish Welfare Fund following the abolition of the Social Fund by the UK 
Department for Work and Pensions in April 2013.  
 
Scottish Labour repeats an appeal to «fairness» via increased levels of individual accountability, 
which aims to align with popular sentiment. In quickly opposing the UK government’s 
«bedroom tax» for under-occupation of state-subsided housing Scottish Labour is attempting to 
regain its core territory and assert its Scottish credentials. Shadow Cabinet Secretary for Welfare, 
Jackie Baillie, introduced a Member’s Bill to protect social tenants from eviction arising from 
housing arrears (in advance of UK Labour’s confirmation in September 2013 of a repeal of the 
‘bedroom tax» if successful in the 2015 Westminster election).  
 
Across the UK there has been a hardening of attitudes towards social welfare and a return to the 
moralistic rhetoric of personal responsibility (rather than economic failure). Austere times have 
resuscitated the «something for nothing» and «nothing for something» problem. The punitive 
turn in welfare is aided by negative media portrayal of «welfare dependency» that influences 
public opinion (Mooney, G. 2009). Within this more punitive regime social responsibilities are 
displaced and re-configured as problems of self-care. This is a version of conformist moral 
communitarianism that emphasises the obligations of citizenship in «austerity localism» 
(Featherstone, D. et al., 2012: p.177). Strategies for poverty reduction would need to go beyond 
«fairness» to address structural inequalities and social exclusion (Scott, G and Mooney, G. 2009). 
A commitment to egalitarian redistribution would require a (re-)turn towards «socio-economic» 
rather than «moral communitarianism» (Driver, S. and Martell, L. 1997: p.42). The collective 
management of risk requires forms of empowerment that amount to more than invitations to 
«problem» communities to bring themselves to order in desired ways. Mooney (2009: p.447) has 
warned of «the danger of replicating regressive ways of thinking» by «listing negatives outside a 
framework which foregrounds structural arguments, inequality and the need for redistribution». 
This is a different form of «othering» that draws on measures of social distance that transcend 
national boundaries. 
 
Territorial politics is filled with different, often contradictory, class content, not least in the appeal to values 
of social justice at the same time as enacting neo-liberal policies in the service of Scotland’s global 
economic competitiveness… In the devolved Scotland, the symbolic national interest in ‘sustainable 
economic growth’ trumps the partisan interest politics of class. (Law, A. and Mooney, G. 2012b: p.172-3) 
 
An important role for «home international» or four nation studies is to illuminate alternatives and 
to bring to the fore some of the tensions within devolution. The universal basis of social 
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citizenship in the UK is threatened by the emergence of different settlements in the constituent 
nations.   Deliberation on the social rights of citizenship is inhibited by a fixation on identities, 
«national» values, and particularly notions of «Britishness» and «Scottishness». The centre-left 
faces a shared challenge in developing a compelling vision of social citizenship against a 
background of resource restriction and shifting public attitudes. Refocusing attention on active 
citizenship and participatory politics, rather than codifying national differences, would help to 
support the cultivation of constructive democratic debate within a «citizen-nation» (Colley, L. 
1999).  
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